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Abstract
Due to the huge volume of digital data and the underlying complexity of data
management, people and companies are motivated to outsource their computational
requirements to the cloud. A significant portion of these productions are used in
health applications. While popular cloud computing platforms provide flexible and
low-priced solutions, unfortunately, they do so with little support for data security
and privacy. This shortcoming clearly threatens sensitive data in cloud platforms.
This is especially true for health information, which should always be adequately
secured via encryption. Providing secure storage and access to health information
that is generated by systems or used in applications, is the main challenge in today’s
health care systems. As a result, owners of sensitive information may hesitate in
purchasing such services, given the risks associated with the unauthorized access to
their data. Considering this problem, researchers have recommended applying en-
cryption algorithms. Data owners never disclose encryption keys in order to keep
their encrypted data secure. Because cloud platforms can not search in data which is
encrypted with regular encryption algorithms, it is supposed that data owners con-
ceal their secrets with searchable encryption algorithms. Searchable encryption is a
family of cryptographic protocols that facilitate private keyword searches directly on
encrypted data. These protocols allow data owners to upload their encrypted data
to the cloud, while retaining the ability to query over uploaded data. In this project,
we focus on symmetric searchable encryption schemes, as well as apply an efficient
ii
searchable encryption scheme which supports multi-keyword searches to provide a
privacy preserving keyword search framework for health data. Our framework ap-
plies a recent secure searchable encryption scheme and employs an inverted indexing
structure in order to process queries in a privacy-preserving manner.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Nowadays, the exponential growth of data challenges all data storage and infrastruc-
tures. In 2014, sources predicted that the total size of digital information globally
would almost double every two years [3, 5]. This global data is expected to hit
44 zettabytes or 44 trillion gigabytes by 2020. In this era, local storage is not the
efficient nor economic solution to save and protect our data. The daily generated
information makes all companies, businesses, end-users, and individuals to outsource
their data and apply cloud servers and applications.
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1.2 Outsourcing Data
Outsourcing data and operations in companies is a significantly critical decision
that managers need to consider. Outsourcing has many advantages which can cause
growth and save money for companies.
All outsourced data centers try to guarantee the quality of service and minimize
the downtime to avoid financial penalties. In a model in which data is outsourced,
the maintaining and upgrading of local infrastructures are carried out by the ser-
vice providers. This advantage gives technology officers and managers more time
to spend on their companies’ goals and business expansion. Moreover, the competi-
tive low price of services presented by famous companies like Amazon, Google, and
Microsoft assist businesses to boost their bottom line. Consequently, outsourcing re-
duces expenses for equipment maintenance, physical space, and upgrade overheads.
Despite several benefits of outsourcing data, there are critical issues that people
should consider. These drawbacks sometimes change the business owners’ minds.
While outsourcing is cost-effective in most cases, there are some hidden costs which
may arise. The data centers, which usually are far away from headquarters, may
cost companies. In the case of outsourcing, natural disasters are other possible
challenges. The most important disadvantage that threatens outsourced data is
exposing confidential data.
Data owners assume that the cloud storage service is secure because it keeps the
data safe and follows the rules and algorithms, but it may try to disclose the plaintext
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and the access patterns of searched keywords. Consequently, a storing server should
be considered a semi-trusted one.
1.2.1 Outsourcing the Health-care Data
Health information is an essential type of data which is mostly considered as confi-
dential data. Previously, medical institutions were responsible for providing required
information systems and preserving the confidentiality of their data. The other
crucial role of technology officers in health organizations is the setting up a secure
mechanism to share private data with all providers and consumers in the format of
a trusted network. In such networks, some consumers receive data and services from
multiple providers while participating in service offerings in different programs across
agencies.
1.2.1.1 Secure Outsourcing
The privacy of health-care data is a critical component of every health department
and agency. In order to share health-care information more comfortably, secure
frameworks and protocols for accessing health information should be provided. A
secure framework that protects outsourced sensitive data can accelerate the strategic
plan to outsource clinical information systems while ensuring privacy and effective-
ness.
3
1.2.2 Big Data
The advancement of big data and cloud computing have made the privacy concerns
even more pressing. Big data significantly increases the challenges in developing
systems to protect privacy. At the same time, being able to process big data to
extract meaningful information and knowledge from raw data is another concern
that threatens the privacy.
1.3 Searchable Encryption
The most natural solution to guarantee the privacy and security of outsourced data is
encryption. A symmetric-key algorithm is a scheme that uses a single cryptographic
key for both encryption and decryption operations. It means that people can learn
nothing about the encrypted data without the right key. However, encryption key
owners want to store their encrypted data on a cloud server while being able to ask
the cloud to search on the encoded dataset and send the related encrypted results
back without decrypting the dataset and the query. In 2000, the earliest scheme for
searching over encrypted data was proposed by Song et al. [61]. That scheme is
known as searchable symmetric encryption (SSE).
Since 2000, many studies were conducted on searchable encryption (SE) schemes.
The studies tried to solve issues of searchable encryption. Early studies provided
schemes for single predefined keywords and combinations of keywords searches, while
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the later studies where about multi-client, public-key based, and substring searchable
encryption schemes. Recently, researchers have been investigating more efficient and
secure schemes.
1.4 Contributions
In this thesis, I focus on efficient multi-client schemes to provide a framework for
health-care data. For example, the laboratory in a hospital stores encrypted records
of patients’ blood tests in a cloud storage server. The data users like doctors or
insurers may be interested in searching specific parts of records. As the data owner,
the hospital can authorize data users to send their encrypted queries to the cloud
server. The framework protects the privacy of original data and queries. Our frame-
work searches over the encrypted data and does not understand anything about the
queried keywords and the original data.
The multi-client search framework for the encrypted health-care data makes the
applications of search methods more usable and improves the operational efficiency.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries and Definitions
As a prelude to further technical discussions, we need to present some basic concepts
and definitions. In this chapter, we review big data concept as well as definitions of
cloud-computing and health informatics.
2.1 Big Data
This refers to growing tremendously large and complex data sets. The size of big
data, which have not been constant, was measured at most in petabytes (1015) up
until 2012 but now is measured in units ranging from exabytes (1018) to yottabytes
(1024) [35]. Big data has its specific challenges in simple data operations, which are
data collection, storing, and sharing, as well as more complicated operations like
data processing and analysis. Protecting privacy, querying, and extracting patterns
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are highly important functions in big data sciences and analyses[10].
2.2 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing refers to providing ubiquitous processing resources and data over
the Internet to consumers CPU and other devices on demand. These resources, which
are networks, virtual machines, databases, applications and other services, can be
easily obtained by the clients, released with minimal management effort and always
supported [53, 49].
2.3 Cryptography
In 1996, Menezes et al. defined cryptography as the study of mathematical tech-
niques related to confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication which are aspects
of information security [50]. Cryptography is about constructing and analyzing pro-
tocols that prevent third parties or the public from reading private messages [11].
Various aspects of information security, such as data confidentiality, data integrity,
authentication, and non-repudiation are central to modern cryptography [50].
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2.4 Edit Distance Metrics
Edit distance metrics are algorithms which determine the least number of editing
operations to transform from one string (e.g. word) to another one. These operations
are insertion, deletion, and substitution [46]. Some metrics like Damerau-Levenshtein
distance [32] considered the transposition of two adjacent letters as another editing
operation.
2.5 Electronic Medical Record (EMR)
All paper charts and treatment information in hospitals, pharmacies, clinics, and
health offices should be digitalized. These digital records in the health sector referred
to as an electronic medical records or EMR. In other words, EMRs are important
information which can be used many times and are tracked for monitoring health
status and treatment process. EMRs have certain strengths over paper version of
medical records because they can easily be saved, reviewed, and shared in health
institutions.
2.6 Electronic Health Record (EHR)
The electronic health record or EHR refers to all health information of a patient’s
treatment and care which is collected by clinicians in hospitals and clinics. A patient’s
EHR can be shared with all authorized doctors, pharmacists, and specialists who
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participate in the patient’s treatment. This term also refers to the systematized
collection of patient and population health information saved in cloud servers [40].
2.7 Personal Health Record (PHR)
Rather than just specialists in health institutions, personal health records (PHR) can
be collected by health-care home devices or by the patient at his/her home. The main
difference between EHRs and PHRs is that PHRs should be managed and organized
by the patient. The patient determines which persons can have the access to the
PHRs. Medical histories, medications, and diagnoses results can be categorized as
PHRs. Tang et al. believe that PHR refers to both paper-based and computerized
health data and information related to the care of a patient that is maintained by
the patient [63].
2.8 Pseudo-Random Function (PRF)
A random function composes a lookup table filled with random entries which are
distributed uniformly. The random function maps entries to unique numbers in a
specific range. A practical PRF is acceptable if it behaves like a random function and
no efficient method can distinguish that a output of a determined entry is produced
by a random function or a PRF. A PRF always outputs a specific value given a
determined input from its domain and a determined random seed number even if it
9
operates multiple times [30, 31].
10
Chapter 3
Background and Challenges
3.1 Overview
In this chapter, we review topics related to our study. We focus on searchable
encryption and related domains which are currently important for researchers. While
reviewing these areas, we take the most important challenges and research questions
into account.
Firstly, we review the searchable encryption definition. Then, we refer to the new
primitive technique which is called Blind Storage and discuss its advantages. We then
review Oblivious RAM (ORAM), the premier technology for securing cloud-based
storages. We refer later to a new generation of ORAM which is more efficient and
useful for multi-client frameworks. In the next chapter, we further discuss crypto-
graphic preliminaries.
11
3.2 Notations
In all following discussed schemes and models, we supposed that the data owner has
a collection that contains n documents (DB).
DB = (d1, ..., dn) (3.1)
W in this study, is considered to be a list of m unique keywords which are
extracted from the owner’s collection and may be queried later.
W = (w1, ..., wm) (3.2)
Widi = {w|w ∈ di and w ∈ W and identifier of the document(di) is idi} (3.3)
∴ W = {
n⋃
i=1
Widi}, n = |DB| (3.4)
Ind is a set of documents’ identifiers.
Ind = {indw1 , ..., indwm} (3.5)
Each DB[wi] or indwi in Ind refers to a set of documents, each of which contains
the keyword wi.
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indwi = DB[wi] = (id|wi ∈ Wid) (3.6)
3.3 Searchable Encryption (SE)
An encryption algorithm that supports lookup functionality over encrypted data
without decryption with the least cloud data leakage is called Searchable Encryption
(SE). Searchable encryption schemes allow a client to query from an untrusted server
to search within encrypted data without having the encryption key and without
learning information about the original plaintext data. Searchable encryption has two
main subsets of schemes which are symmetric searchable encryption (SSE) schemes
and public key encryption with keyword search (PKES) schemes [19].
3.3.1 General Model
A searchable encryption generally operates three primary phases in order to accom-
plish keyword lookup: setup, token, and search.
The duty of the setup phase is to create encrypted data and the related encryption
key K ′ using plaintext data and a secret parameter (1K) which is a K-bit vector.
In this phase, the data owner creates inverted indexes of the keyword list Ind and
13
Figure 3.1: Searchable Encryption Setup
outsource them (Figure 3.1). -
Ind = Create IndexK′(DB = (d1, ..., dn),W = (w1, ..., wm)). (3.7)
The inverted index array is a set of indexes, each of which belongs to a word from
word list W and determines documents which contain that specific word. The size
of Ind in Equation 3.7 is the same as the size of the word list |W | = |Ind| = m.
The documents should be encrypted with the owner’s key (K ′) using an encryp-
tion algorithm (Enc). The owner uploads the encrypted collection and the inverted
index to the server.
EDB = EncK′(DB = (d1, ..., dn)). (3.8)
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The Token function takes as input the produced secret key, a query, and returns
the related token tk. The query can be a boolean function of multiple keywords.
tk = TokenK′(query) (3.9)
The last main operator is search which uses token tk and the inverted indexes
in order to retrieve the set of matching encrypted documents and sends them to the
user.
3.3.2 Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE)
In SSE schemes, data owners create encrypted data and related indexes using a
symmetric secret key. The indexes will be used later to search over encrypted data.
In general, a SSE consists of two main function: Setup and Search.
Setup. This function generates a secret key for the received database and outputs
the associated encrypted database. The data owner receives the secret key
while the encrypted database is stored in the cloud storage server.
Search. Having the secret key of the encrypted data enables the client to send a
secure query to the storage server. The storage operates the search function
and receives the identifiers of encrypted documents or records. The storage
server sends the encrypted items to the querier afterwards.
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3.3.2.1 Dynamic Symmetric Searchable Encryption (DSSE)
A dynamic searchable symmetric encryption scheme (DSSE) includes all functions
of a SSE scheme. A DSSE also has an extra function which is Update. The Update
function generates a new secret key and reproduce the encrypted database. This
function will be invoked after updating documents or keyword list of the database.
Update also have to be called after revoking a user. That being dealt with, some
SSE schemes are introduced in Chapter 4 which do not require updating the database
after revoking a user.
3.3.3 Security Definitions
Song et al. [61] as the first proposers of a SE scheme proved that their scheme is
secure. Later, the scientists in this area proposed some formal security definitions
which are discussed as follows.
3.3.3.1 Indistinguishable Against Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA)
A scheme is IND-CPA if the user cannot distinguish the ciphertexts of two chosen
plaintexts. In other words, the encrypted data does not leak anything about plaintext
data. The IND-CPA is not proper notion of security for SE schemes because it does
not consider query or trapdoor as the matter of leakage.
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3.3.3.2 Semantic Security Against Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attack
(IND-CKA)
In 2003, Goh [37] defined a secure index and two security models for indexes which
was semantic security against adaptive chosen keyword attack (IND-CKA). A IND-
CKA secure scheme doesn’t let the adversary deduce the content of a document
using its index. In other words, a server, which contains an index and two encrypted
document containing same number of words, cannot distinguish the document that
the index is related to. Chang and Mitzenmacher [27] in their study as well as Goh in
his second definition [37] introduced new versions of IND-CKA which an adversary
cannot distinguish indexes of documents with containing different number of words.
Chang and Mitzenmacher tried to guarantee the privacy of users’ queries while Goh
did not guarantee trapdoors’ leaking in either of his both definitions of IND-CKA.
This means that the trapdoors may reveal the queried keywords which is not secure
enough definition for SE schemes.
3.3.3.3 Non-adaptive and Adaptive Indistinguishability Security for SSE
In 2006, and later in 2011 Curtmola et al [30, 31], considering the shortcomings
of previous security notions for SSE, presented non-adaptive and adaptive indis-
tinguishability security which avoided previous notions’ problems. In non-adaptive
definition (IND-CKA1), a scheme preserves the privacy of keywords and trapdoors
against an adversary who runs the queries in a batch. This definition is not quite
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practical in real world and is improved in second definition of Curtmola et al [30, 31].
In the adaptive indistinguishability notion of security for SSE (IND-CKA2), which is
practical and considered as a solid definition for SSE, an adversary client can choose
a query considering previous obtained trapdoors and search results.
3.4 Bloom Filter
A Bloom filter refers to a hashed data structure which securely indicates the mem-
bership of an element in a set. A Bloom filter encompasses an array with b bits and
k independent hash functions which maps each input to a position in the b bits array.
Bloom Array : [0, 0, ..., 0
b
] (3.10)
ht : {0, 1}
∗ → [1, b] for t ∈ [1, k] (3.11)
In order to apply a Bloom filter to determine the set’s membership, the Bloom
array initially is set to zero for all bits. Then, for each element ei in the set {e1, ..., en},
all ht(ei) positions in Bloom array are set to one. In order to check membership of
an element ex by a server which don’t have access the the original set, it’s sufficient
to only check that the all ht(ex) positions in Bloom array were set to one.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the elements of the set is mapped to array cells with hash
18

erations while they are hidden from the server. The blind storage does not need any
specific function or tool on remote servers and can be used in conventional cloud
storage servers like Google Drive and Dropbox.
3.6 Oblivious Random Access Memory (Oblivious
RAM, ORAM)
Although encryption algorithms hide the contents of data from the remote server,
none of those algorithms can conceal the users’ access patterns of reading and writing
data. The access pattern can leak the number of operations as well as operands
and operator of each operation. The information leaked from access patterns can
seriously endanger the privacy of encrypted data [65]. The oblivious RAM primitive
principally ensures privacy-preserving for users’ data on an untrusted remote storage
server.
The main goal of oblivious RAM schemes is addressing the revealing memory
access issue of CPUs from untrusted memories while reading or storing processes.
This scheme keeps search and the memory access independent [54]. While the ba-
sic scheme is extremely secure and recommended by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [38],
many studies were carried out to improve its performance and make it scheme more
practical [21, 29, 33, 38, 39, 45, 56, 57, 62, 67].
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [70] is a cryptographic primitive that hides the access
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pattern of a trusted CPU to an untrusted memory. From an untrusted memory
perspective, any two accesses to the memory are indistinguishable, even if the trusted
CPU is accessing the same data.
As was mentioned previously, ORAM hides the access patterns of CPU from
untrusted memory. In an outsourcing context, we can consider that the CPU is a
client who queries and that untrusted memory is a cloud server which stores our
data. Running the queries by the server does not leak any information about the
location and type of retrieved encrypted data.
3.7 Basic Cross-Tags (BXT) Protocol
In 2013, Cash et al. [26] proposed the Basic Cross-Tags or BXT protocol. The
BXT, as an extension to single-keyword SSE (SKS), is a new scheme for conjunctive
keyword search. The BXT addressed its previous schemes’ issues for conjunctive
keyword search. Some of those problems were related to time and space complexities.
Sometimes the time and space complexities, as the major criteria of SSE algorithms,
cause those schemes to become infeasible for big data. The main challenge, which
was discussed in the earlier studies, was the linear relationship of the cloud server’s
workload and the number of encoded documents for searching each keyword set.
Cash et al. [26] proposed a sub-linear conjunctive search scheme for the first time.
This protocol applies some main functions to operate a conjunctive keyword
search on encrypted data. These modules are discussed as follows:
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EDBSetup(DB). This function outputs TSet as the “secure inverted index” and
XSet as the related set data structure. These two items are considered as the
encrypted database EDB and will be sent to the cloud server. TSet contains
the encrypted indexes of keywords from W . XSet is a specific data structure
that contains a set of xtags for every keyword in W and all related indexes.
Each xtag in XSet, which is calculated using two unpredictable functions, is
the result of keywords in W and their related indexes. The client, who owns
the database and later wants to query on that, generates encryption keys for
encrypting the database.
Search. This protocol contains several functions which should be operated by the
server and clients. We can suppose that the client wants to query a conjunction
of keywords like:
w¯ =
k∧
1
wi (3.12)
The client chooses the keyword wf from that conjunction which is used least
often in the outsourced data and f is the index of that keyword in the conjunc-
tion. Later, the client generates the encryption key (Ke) related to wf , finds the
inverted index(stag) for that keyword, and calculates inverted indexes (xtrap)
for the rest of the keywords in that conjunction. The client sends Ke, stag
and all xtraps to the server. The cloud server, which holds ciphertexts and
runs queries on the encrypted data, uses the stag to retrieve the least frequent
keyword’s index set T (wf ) from TSet. After retrieving the encrypted set, the
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cloud server decrypts all indexes in T (wf ) and sends each decrypted index ind
to the server if the following formula is true for all xtraps which f is selected
from a pseudo-random function family(PRF).
∀i ∈ (1, ..., k), f(xtrapi, ind) ∈ XSet (3.13)
3.8 Oblivious Cross-Tags (OXT) Protocol
In this section, we review the Oblivious Cross-Tags (OXT) protocol which has been
proposed by Cash et al. [26] in 2013 and is theoretically based on the BXT scheme.
The main issue of the BXT is its serious leakage. Xtraps are created using PRF
and a secret key KX . As was indicated about the BXT in the previous section,
the server should have the decryption key Ke in order to retrieve the indexes of
documents which contain wi as well as xtraps of other keywords in the conjunction
to calculate xtag and to check if that belongs to XSet. In other words, the server
needs decryption key Ke and xtraps to calculate xtags and find out which indexes of
stag contain other queried keywords in that conjunction. Providing such information
discloses some sensitive facts, like statistical correlation of queries and documents, to
curious and leaky cloud servers. The presenters of the OXT protocol addressed this
problem in their scheme by using an oblivious shared computation of xtag between
server and client during the search process. They engaged a blinded Diffie-Hellman
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(DH) exponentiation over a group G of prime order p. In order to reduce overhead
of interactions between the client and remote server, Cash et al. [26] considered that
the blinding parts of the formula must be the EDBSetup phase and stored in TSet.
The OXT protocol, like the BXT protocol, has two phases of EDBSetup and
search which are discussed as follows:
EDBSetup(DB). As it is shown in Algorithm 1, EDBSetup generates more secure
TSet and XSet. In the first step of this phase, the algorithm creates strapi for
every keyword wi in keyword list W using PRF and a secret key Ks. Straps
are required to generate the encryption keys Ke for encrypting both indexes of
documents which match wi and related record-decrypting keys (rdk) of match-
ing documents. The indexes of documents and xtraps of queried keywords were
previously required in the search phase of the BXT to calculate xtags. In the
OXT, in order to compute xtags in a manner that the cloud server does not
learn anything about either xtraps or inds, a blinded DH computation should
be applied and pre-computed blinding factors should be stored in TSet as a
part of tuples. Each tuple of T [wi] is related to a keyword wi and a matching
document index indj and indj belongs to Iwi set. A blinding factor in each
tuple is yc, which is calculated by multiplication of xindj and z
−1
c . The xindj
is output of a PRF (Fp) that gets indj and zc is generated by the same Fp
that takes a counter c as its input. The applied Fp is a PRF with the range of
Z∗p . XSet in the OXT is updated regarding its previous definition in the BXT.
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The new XSet stores a more secure formula of xtags for every keyword wi and
every matched document index indj is calculated using the following formula:
xtagi,j = xtrap(wi)
xindj (3.14)
In previous xtags, xtrap(wi)s are calculated as follows:
xtrap(wi) = g
F2(KX ,wi) (3.15)
After generating xtags they will be added to XSet.
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Algorithm 1 Prepare Encrypted Data
procedure EDBSetup(Data D, Array of Encryption Keys RDK[])
XSet← empty set for xtags
T← empty associative array for allowed keywords W
for each w ∈ W do
t← empty list for encrypted indexes
strap← F1(Ks, w) ⊲ F1 is a pseudo random function
Ke ← F1(strap, 2) and Kz ← F1(strap, 1)
c← 1
for each indi of D’s documents which contains w do
rdki ← RDK(indi) ⊲ rdki is the encryption key for document i
xind← F2(KI , indi) ⊲ F2 is a pseudo random function
zc ← F2(Kz, c) and c← c+ 1
y ← xind · z−1c
e← Enc(Ke, rdki)
t← t ∪ (e, y)
xtag ← gF2(KX ,w)·xind
XSet← XSet ∪ xtag
end for
T [w]← t
end for
TSet← empty tuple set
(TSet,KT )← TSetSetup(T )
ED = (TSet,XSet)
SendEDToServer(ED)
end procedure
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Search. The general idea in the search phase is to calculate the xtag of each xind in
tuples of T [wi] and test if it is a member of XSet or not. The search phase can
be separated into two main functions. TokenGeneration, which is illustrated in
Algorithm 2, should be operated by the client. The server operates the second
part, which is the actual search process. TokenGeneration generates stag for
the least frequent keyword (wf ) of the conjunction of keywords which has to
be queried. TokenGeneration also generates the xtoken[c] array of cth tuple of
T [wf ]. The client sends the stag and xtoken[c] to the server.
xoken[c] = {xtoken[c, i]|1 < i < |w¯| and i 6= f} (3.16)
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Algorithm 2 Client Side of the Search Protocol
1: procedure TokenGeneration
2: stag ← TSetGetTag(KT , w1)
3: SendStagToServer(stag)
4: strap← F1(KS, w1)
5: Ke ← F1(strap, 2)
6: Kz ← F1(strap, 1) ⊲ F1 is a pseudo random function
7: c← 1
8: while ReceivedStopFromServer() do
9: zc ← F1(Kz, c) ⊲ F1 is a pseudo random function
10: xtoken[c]← empty array ⊲ xtoken is a two dimensions array
11: for i = 2, ..., n do
12: xtoken[c][i]← gF1(KX ,wi)·zc
13: end for
14: SendXtokenToServer(xtoken[c])
15: c← c+ 1
16: end while
17: end procedure
Algorithm 3 shows the second main function of the search phase which should
be operated by the server. At first, the server receives the stag and achieves
the related t or T [wf ]. The server later receives the xtokens from the client.
For each xtoken[c], the server accesses the cth tuple of T [wf ] which is (ec, yc).
As previously stated, T [wf ] is an array of tuples whose length is the same as
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the number of documents which contain wf . After catching the xtoken[c] and
(ec, yc), the server calculates xtag for all indexes of xtoken[c] and sends ec to the
client if all indexes of xtoken[c] were members of XSet. Later, the client can
decrypt ec and find out which indexes contain the whole queried conjunction.
Algorithm 3 Server Side of the Search Protocol
1: procedure Search(Encrypted Date ED) ⊲ ED contains TSet and XSet
2: stag ← AskStagFromPatient()
3: t← TSetRetrive(TSet, stag)
4: for c = 1, . . . , sizeof(t) do
5: xtoken[c]← AskCthTokenArrayFromPatient()
6: (ec, yc)← c
th tuple of t
7: for i = 2, . . . , n do ⊲ n is the number of keywords in the query
8: if xtoken[c][i]y is member of XSet then
9: SendEToPatient(ec)
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: SendStopToPatient()
14: end procedure
As was discussed in this section, the issue of the BXT was addressed and the semi-
trusted server checked the membership of xtags without having xtraps, indexes (ind),
and decryption key of indexes (Ke).
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3.9 Multi-Client OXT Protocol (MC-OXT)
In their study, Jarecki et al. [42] extended the OXT protocol and provided the
Multi-Client OXT (MC-OXT) which supported multi-client SSE (MC-SSE) while
preserving the OXT features and functionalities. In the MC-SSE, the data owner
encrypts its data and outsources it to the cloud server which securely operates key-
word searches. The client, who differs from the data owner in this scheme, sends
the query to the data owner and receives the related tokens to perform the keyword
search in the cloud server. The server applies tokens, searches for the results, and
returns the encrypted indexes to the data owner.
In this protocol, Jarecki et al. [42] defines three phases for their multi-client
solution which are described as follows:
EDBSetup(DB, RDK). In the MC-OXT protocol, the EDBSetup phase has al-
most the same steps as the EDBSetup in the OXT. The only difference is that
the MC-OXT protcol shares an additional key between the data owner and
cloud server.
GenToken(K,w¯). GenToken is the specific phase designed for the MC-OXT. The
purpose of this phase is to authorize a client and to enable him/her to search
a specific conjunction of keywords over the encrypted data stored in the cloud
server. In this regard, the client sends the conjunction of keywords to the data
owner. The data owner calculates the stag and strap for the least frequent
30
keyword (wf ). The data owner also generates bxtrap terms for the rest of
the keywords in that conjunction. The bxtrap terms are being calculated as
follows:
bxtrapi = g
Fp(KX ,wi).ρi , ρi ∈ Z
∗
p (3.17)
The data owner sends bxtrap terms as well as the encrypted stag and ρi to the
client for the search process. ρ1, ..., ρn, which are generated for all keywords
in the conjunction except the least frequent keyword, are one-time blinding
factors which hide real xtrap from the client. The data owner encrypts the
stag and blinding factors ρi, saves them in a single message env, and provides
the env to the client. During the search process, having the env file shows that
the client is authenticated.
Search. At the first step of the search, the client computes required keys using strap
previously provided by the data owner. Instead of xtoken terms of the OXT
protocol, the client computes bxtoken terms as follows:
bxtoken[c] = {bxtoken[c, i]|1 < i < |w¯| and i 6= f} (3.18)
bxtoken[c, i] = bxtrapZci (3.19)
The client sends bxtoken terms and the env to the server. The server decrypts
the env and achieves stag and blinding factors. After obtaining the stag, like
the OXT protocol, the server retrieves the TSet(wf ) and looks for tuples in
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TSet(wf ) which are valid for the following statement:
∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |w¯| and i 6= f, bxtoken[c, i]yc/ρi ∈ XSet (3.20)
In this formula, which is a replacement for the one in the OXT protocol, the
server obtains the xtokens by raising the the bxtoken to the power of y/ρ. The
ρ values are blinding factors achieved by decrypting the env.
One of the issues of the MC-OXT protocol is leaking the size of T (wf ) to the client.
Indeed, the negotiation between the client and server for transferring bxtoken terms
and results may leak the |T (wf )|. This issue of the original scheme should be con-
sidered and resolved in complementary schemes.
3.10 Research Challenges
The keyword search and query processing on encrypted data schemes have actively
been updated and improved for more than a decade, although significant challenges
and open issues still exist.
In general, private-key solutions are faster but suffer from a key management
problem. On the other hand, public-key solutions provide more flexibility but their
running times are much higher than private-key protocols. Furthermore, parties may
sometimes be forced to share data in order to comply with regulations or agreements.
The open issues includes lots of important topics like improving Paillier scheme,
adding update function to searchable encryption schemes for large databases [25],
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designing dynamic search [44], and preserving cloud security.
While some of the challenges are introduced by new methods and developments in
cryptography, the other challenges are more established. The most important aspect
of a scheme is to be applicable in real world systems. Every system that has been
proposed represents a trade-off between functionality, security, and performance.
In this project, we propose a framework for multi-client keyword search on out-
sourced encrypted electronic health records (EHR) using searchable encryption schemes.
3.10.1 Searchable Encryption Weaknesses
In general, a searchable encryption protocol may leak information in various ways.
The main types of leakage in searchable encryption schemes are: information of
indexes, search patterns, and access patterns.
Index information. This type of leakage basically points out the information about
preserved documents and related contained keywords in those documents. The
number of documents in the database, keywords in each document, and size
of keyword list can be placed in this category. Some studies indicate that
similarities between the documents belong to this class as well.
Search pattern. All information that may be leaked during the search process is
categorized as the search pattern leakage group. The group may refer to two
different searches which have the same results. The statistical analysis that
may determine the actual searched keywords can be categorized in this class.
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Access pattern. The access pattern group mainly covers the leaked information
from query results. The comparison of results of two queries can express some
ideas about restrictiveness of queries.
3.10.2 Ideal Solution
The ideal solution for SE schemes reveals nothing about the remotely stored files
and indexes, results of queries, or the pattern of search. Most of the schemes, previ-
ously applied on health records, usually leak at least the search and access patterns.
We introduce an efficient framework and illustrate its complexity, performance, and
feasibility over EHR. That being said, the minimum information leakage in some
steps of the scheme still persist. In Chapter 4, various related SE schemes, their
performance, and their security are discussed.
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Chapter 4
Related Works
All SE models can be reviewed according to different features. In each SE model,
there are three kinds of parties. The first one is the data owner or data writer. The
second one is the server or data storer. The third one is the reader or client who
sends the queries to the server.
4.1 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric primitives
Some searchable encryption schemes, which are based on symmetric algorithms, allow
only one user to create searchable ciphertexts from plaintexts and create trapdoors
for those ciphertexts using a symmetric encryption key. In the traditional definition,
it is also the same while reading and searching keywords on those ciphertexts. In
other words, only the person who holds the symmetric key can read and search over
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ciphertexts. These schemes are called single-user or single writer/single reader (S/S).
In 2000, Song et al. [61] proposed the first single-user scheme. Afterwards, some
symmetric schemes presented which changed the definition of symmetric searchable
encryptions. Those schemes allowed more readers to query the database.
Asymmetric searchable schemes, which are based on asymmetric encryption and
use private and public keys in their structure, can be searched and queried by more
than one user. These schemes can be considered as multi-user schemes. In 2004,
Boneh et al. [16] proposed the first SE scheme using public keys. That scheme was
entitled “Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search” (PEKS).
4.2 SE’s General Model
In 2000, Song et al. [61] achieved searchable encryption by crafting a two-layered
structure. In this scheme, the owner outsourced the encrypted data and hashed
keywords to the cloud server. This server can indicate that a keyword exists in
ciphertexts by extracting the hash value of the keyword and comparing it with the
embedded hashed keywords. While Song et al. proved that their system was IND-
CPA secure, it was less trusted than an encryption algorithm without the searching
advantage. There were some disadvantages for Song’s scheme. The first one was
that before encrypting a file, its text should be split into same sized strings. This
method does not follow common file encryption standards. The other disadvantage
was about their specific two-layer algorithm. This algorithm was only applicable for
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text based files.
Brinkman et al. [23] applied Song and her colleagues’ model to XML based
files. Popa et al. [59] also illustrated Song et al.’s model can be used for encrypting
databases.
4.3 Single-user vs. Multi-user
As discussed earlier, SE schemes are built on the client/server model, where the
server stores encrypted data on behalf of one or more clients (i.e., the writers). To
request content from the server, one or more clients (i.e., readers) are able to generate
trapdoors for the server, which then searches on behalf of the client. In these models,
the reader and writer can be either the same client or different clients. In the case
that the writer and reader are different, the model is also called date sharing [19].
4.3.1 User Revocation
One of the important requirements of multi-reader schemes is the user revocation.
The data owner cancels the access permission of a user to the owner’s data by
revoking a user [48]. There are two main ways for user revocation: direct [7, 47, 55]
and indirect [6, 41, 58, 68, 71] revocation methods. In the direct method, the data
owner re-encrypts data and specifies the revocation list. In the indirect method, the
data owner, who periodically updates users’ access keys, only updates non-revoked
users’ keys. In 2006, Curtmola et al. [30] applied the broadcast encryption (BE)
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[36] in order to implement their multi-user scheme. The user revocation in the
implementation of Curtmola et al. was challenging. This scheme had only one
shared key for all readers, so the user revocation required distributing a new key
between all current authorized users.
4.4 Searchable Encryption Architectures
As discussed in Section 4.3, SE models can be explored regarding the number of
users participating in models. The SE models can be categorized into single-user
and multi-user schemes.
4.4.1 Single-user Schemes
The general idea in a single-user scheme is that the user, who owns the symmetric
encryption key, encrypts the plaintext and outsources the searchable ciphertext. The
same person also creates trapdoors and provides those to the data holder or the cloud
in order to search over the encrypted data. Asymmetric key systems are also used
for single-user schemes.
4.4.1.1 The Practical Technique of Song et al.
As previously discussed in Section 4.2, Song et al. [61] proposed the first applicable
SE scheme which was based on encrypting fixed-size words and embedding the related
hash value for those words. The generated searchable ciphertext is outsourced to a
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cloud server. For the search phase, the user sends the encrypted keyword and the key
used for generating the related hash value of the keyword to the cloud server. The
server later checks all embedded hash values with the received encrypted keyword
and the key to verify if they match or not. The server sends the related ciphertext
if they match up.
The scheme of Song et al. leaks the position of matched hash values and con-
sequently the position of matched keyword and ciphertext in each query. Also, sta-
tistical analysis gives some information about the queries to the semi-trusted cloud
server and allows for the possibility of the plaintext or keywords to be figured out.
4.4.1.2 Goh’s Secure Indexes
In 2003, Goh [37] tackled some weaknesses and constraints of Song et al.’s search-
able encryption model. Goh applied indexes for encrypted documents. They used
a Bloom filter (BF) [14] for each document as the document’s index. The Bloom
filter, which is discussed in Section 3.4, provides linear search time in the number
of encrypted documents. The structural issue of hash functions and Bloom filters is
their false-positive possibility which means two different keywords have same Bloom
array positions. Goh applied two level hash functions and unique document identi-
fiers in order to mitigate false positive risks. A proper identifier should be selected
to produce unique Bloom filters even for two documents with the same keyword sets.
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4.4.1.3 Chang and Mitzenmacher’s Prebuilt Dictionary
Chang and Mitzenmacher [27] proposed two solutions which were similar to what
Goh presented. They used a prebuilt dictionary to generate an array of bits (index)
for each document. Each bit in the array of a document indicated the presence of
a keyword in that document. The prebuilt dictionary could be held in the client
side (first solution) or the server side (second solution). In the second solution,
the prebuilt dictionary should be encrypted for the sake of security. Both solutions
supported the document collection’s updating. Their security definition has been
broken by Curtmola et al. [30].
4.4.1.4 Curtmola et al.’s Inverted Indexes
In addition to presenting a couple of standard security definitions, Curtmola et al.
in 2006 [30] and later in 2011 [31] proposed two new constructions which satisfied
their strong security definitions for SSE. Their schemes were based on associating
indexes to distinct keywords instead of documents, which is called inverted indexes.
Curtmola et al. illustrated that their schemes are optimal and more efficient than
other previous SSE schemes. They also presented an extension of their schemes
which was a multi-user searchable symmetric encryption (MSSE).
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4.4.1.5 Liesdonk et al.’s SSE Schemes with Efficient Update
In 2010, Van Liesdonk et al. [64] proposed two new schemes which used an inverted
index for keywords. Liesdonk et al. proved that their schemes are IND-CKA2 secure
and satisfy Curtmola’s security definitions. Their schemes also had logarithmic time
complexity in the number of unique keywords for their secure search and their docu-
ments were updatable. Their first scheme was faster in searching computation while
the second one had less communication overhead. The second scheme also efficiently
provided updating stored documents as well as undoing the updates.
4.4.1.6 Effective Fuzzy Keyword Search Scheme
In 2010, Li et al. proposed a scheme to provide private fuzzy keyword search. This
scheme acts like other SE schemes if the searched keyword matches with the pre-
defined keyword list of outsourced encrypted data. However, the scheme was more
powerful than regular SE schemes because the scheme returns possible matching files
for the keywords which are similar to original searched keyword based on edit dis-
tance1 metrics The idea behind their solution was to generate trapdoors for similar
strings to the each main keyword in keyword list. They proved that their scheme
is secure in their updated definition of IND-CKA1 which allowed encrypted indexes
leak Edit distances.
1 Edit distance is defined in Section 2.4
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4.4.1.7 Chase and Kamara’s Scheme for Structured Data
Chase and Kamara [28] targeted the issues of privately querying structured data. In
order to achieve their purposes, they presented a novel searchable encryption model
which was called structured encryption as well as the related security definition for
the structured data. In general, their scheme generalizes the index generation of SSE
for structured and labeled data. They illustrated the performance of their scheme
for matrix-structured and labeled data. In summary, their scheme setup contains
the following steps: padding data items, permuting the location of data items and
matrix cells, and encrypting the permuted matrix cells. The cloud storage server
can operate the query on matrices by receiving the permuted location of cells and
encrypted contents. The server also runs search for labeled data as soon as it receives
the permuted keyword. The server then returns permuted indexes of data items.
While Chase and Kamara’s scheme is IND-CKA2 secure and hides its structure from
honest-but-curious server, the scheme leaks the search and access patterns.
4.4.1.8 Kamara et al.’s Dynamic SSE scheme
In 2012, Kamara et al. presented a new scheme in order to make SSE schemes
more practical for real-world cloud storage servers. This IND-CKA2 secure scheme
mainly provided the efficient updating of encrypted documents as well as operating
the keyword search in a sub-linear time. Kamara et al. extended Curtmola et
al.’s inverted index scheme [30] and applied homomorphic encryption to modify the
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encrypted documents’ pointers without decrypting them.
4.4.1.9 Bo¨sch et al.’s Selective Document Retrival (SDR) Scheme
Bo¨sch et al. [20] proposed a new cryptographic primitive called selective document
retrieval (SDR) which is comparable with SSE. This primitive was used for outsourc-
ing searchable encrypted data. They also provided a scheme based on SDR which
guaranteed the privacy of indexes, trapdoors, and query results. Their searchable
encrypted data construction was based on Chang and Mizenmacher’s index genera-
tion [27] and homomorphic encryption. Their search algorithm also was implemented
based on Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan’s lattice-based symmetric scheme [22].
4.4.1.10 Cash et al.’s Conjunctive Keyword Search
In 2013, Cash et al. presented a new SSE scheme for conjunctive keyword search over
outsourced encrypted data. The scheme implements its idea using communication
with the cloud server. The idea of Cash et al.’s scheme, which is based on Curtmola
et al.’s inverted index [30], is that the user creates an index for the least frequent
keyword in the conjunction and sends specific index for the rest of keywords and
sends them to the outsourced server. The server retrieves the encrypted index set
for the least frequent keyword and checks if the other keywords belong to the index
set and returns the encrypted IDs of documents which contains all keywords. Cash et
al. generalized the definition of IND-CKA2 for conjunctive keyword search schemes
and proved that their scheme is IND-CKA2 secure.
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4.4.2 Multi-user Schemes
4.4.2.1 The First SE Scheme Using Public Key Encryption
In 2004, Boneh et al. [16] were the first group of researchers who proposed an
asymmetric searchable encryption in 2004. This scheme is called public encryption
keyword search (PEKS). PEKS enables a third-party to test weather a ciphertext,
which is encrypted with a public key, contains a specific keyword. The third-party is
required to receive a particular key from public key holder in order to check weather
the ciphertext contains that specific keyword. PEKS implies Boneh and Franklin’s
Identity Based Encryption (IBE)[17]. While the security of PEKS can be proved
based on the security of IBE constructions, PEKS scheme is vulnerable to the off-
line keyword-guessing attack [24, 70]. This type of attack enables the third-party to
store particular keys (trapdoor) and apply them to understand plaintext data.
Later in 2007, Boneh et al. [18] introduced a new scheme to provide private
information retrieval (PIR) over encrypted data in order to preserve users’ access
patterns hidden. Their scheme provided the non-interactive communication between
any user with the data owner. An extenssion to this scheme allowed Boneh el al.’s
scheme to tolerate malicious users [18].
4.4.2.2 Using Group Ciphers for Bloom Filters by Bellovin and Cheswick
Using Pohlig-Hellman Encryption as a group cipher for Bloom filters, Bellovin and
Cheswick [12], presented a scheme for secure and protected searches among mutu-
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ally semi-trusted parties in 2004. Their model enabled a semi-trusted server, which
holds the database, to perform queries of multiple clients in such a way that neither
database owner nor the server understands the original queries of clients. The main
issue of their scheme is allowing false-positives due to the use of Bloom filters.
4.4.2.3 Curtmola et al.’s Multi-User Setting
In 2006, Curtmola et al. [30] presented two algorithms for mutli-user SE. They up-
dated their scheme in 2011 [31]. They defined the multi-user setting for searchable
symmetric encryption. In this scheme, an arbitrary group of users are authorized
to query the encrypted data saved on a semi-trusted server. This model, using the
efficient structure, enabled the data owner to revoke query privileges from current
users and authorize new users. The presenters of the multi-user setting considered
that the cloud server was honest-but-curious. The idea behind the multi-user setting
is to combine a single-user SSE scheme with a broadcast encryption algorithm. Nev-
ertheless, they stated that their model can even be robust against malicious servers
if they applied memory checking [15] and universal arguments techniques [9].
4.4.2.4 Baek et al.’s Revisited PEKS Scheme
Baek et al. [8] proposed an updated PEKS in order to address some issues in Boneh et
al.’s original scheme [16] which were unsolved. Baek et al. indicated that their scheme
had removed secure channel. Their scheme also supported refreshing keywords and
processing multiple keywords. The main idea behind their scheme was adding key
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pair for the storage server. They also proved the security of their model.
4.4.2.5 Applying Query Rerouter
Raykova et al. [60] in their proposed definition and implementation, which was called
Secure Anonymous Database Search, applied two trusted parties the query router
(QR) and index server (IS). QR and IS are trusted and receive a limited information
which enables them to operate. IS holds secure indexes which produced by the data
owner and operates actual query without learning about queries and data. QR route
queries and results between queriers and IS without revealing the identity of queriers.
Raykova et al. introduced Re-routable Encryption which translates the encrypted
queries for IS in such a way that keeps queries untraceable. The proposed scheme
by Rayka et al. allows false-positives because of using Bloom filter.
4.4.2.6 Yang et al.’s Bilinear Map
In 2011, Yang et al. [69] presented a scheme for multi-user private queries on an
encrypted database with user revocation ability. In this scheme, allocating a distinct
key to each user prevented the re-encryption of the database and re-generation of
query keys after revoking a user. They applied bilinear maps in their scheme so all
users generate a same index for a specific key. Yang et al. presented an extended
definition of IND-CKA2 for the multi-user keyword search and proved that their
scheme fulfills the definition’s conditions.
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4.4.2.7 Jarecki et al.’s Multi-Client OXT and Symmetric Private Infor-
mation Retrieval (PIR) schemes
Jarecki et al. [42] proposed an extension of the OXT scheme for multi-user SSE
which is called mulit-client SSE (MC-SSE). They also proposed another scheme which
preserves the privacy of outsourced database third-parties or clients from the data
owner. This feature is an extra to what basic SSE schemes provide. The SSE schemes
allow the authorized clients only access to the results of what they queried while the
cloud server does not learn anything about the queries and plaintext results. In this
scheme Jarecki et al. extended the Cash et al.’s OXT scheme [26]. For the security
definition of the scheme, Jarecki et al. considered the data owner as an adversarial
entity in addition to the cloud server which was previously defined as an adversary
by SSE security definitions. The designers of this scheme proved that their scheme
is secure regarding their definition.
4.4.2.8 Orencik et al.’s Multi-Keyword Search
In 2016, Orencik et al. proposed a multi-keyword search over encrypted data while
preserving the privacy of the search operation. In this scheme, Orencik et al. ad-
dressed the leaking of access patterns as well as the correlation of queries and their
results issues. They also presented a new compression method to mitigate the com-
munication between the scheme’s parties as well as a novel raking and scoring al-
gorithm for their multi-keyword search scheme. In addition to their schemes, they
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proposed security definition which preserves privacy of queries and distinguishability.
Orencik et al. proved that their scheme meets the definition’s criteria.
4.4.2.9 Dai et al.’s SSE Schemes Against Memory Leakage
In 2016, Dai et al. proposed two schemes which addressed the memory leakage prob-
lem of SSE schemes. In their first IND-CKA2 secure scheme, which called memory
leakage-resilient searchable symmetric encryption (MLR-SSE), Dai et al. extended
Curtmola’s scheme [30] and applied physical unclonable functions (PUF)2 in order to
strengthen the privacy of private-keys. Dai et al. also presented dynamic MLR-SSE
(DMLR-SSE) which was more efficient and non-adaptive indistinguishability secure.
Dai et al. proved that the DMLR-SSE is as efficient as Cash et al.’s SSE scheme [25]
while it is more secure than Cash et al.’s scheme because Dai et al. applied PUFs in
their scheme.
2A physical unclonable function is a hardware which provides a unique identity for semi-
conductors like processors
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Chapter 5
Proposed System
In this chapter, a framework is proposed for the privacy preserving multi-user key-
word search over outsourced encrypted health data. The recently proposed SSE
scheme by Jarecki et al. [42], which is discussed in Sections 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9, is
applied. This searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) scheme provides search ability
over encrypted information for authorized users. The data owner, who outsources
his/her encrypted data to cloud storage servers, authorizes the users to access the
encrypted data.
5.1 Involved Models and Parties
This section introduces the parties and their duties in the proposed privacy-preserving
keyword search over encrypted health data system. In this section, use case dia-
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grams are applied to illustrate all parties responsibilities in our system. Parties in
our framework are introduced as follows:
Patient The patient or the data owner processes and outsources the data to the cloud
server. In a single-user architecture, the patient, who owns and keeps the
encryption key, runs the query at the cloud server and is able to decrypt the
retrieved encrypted results. However, in a multi-user architecture, the patient
delegates the search ability to the authorized users. In other words, the patient
provides search tokens to the authorized users.
Cloud Server The cloud storage server receives the encrypted information as well as encrypted
indexes or meta-data and protects them against loss or theft. However, in our
scheme the cloud server is considered as a semi-trusted or honest-but-curious
one which executes the search operation and returns the results honestly. This
means, while the server cannot learn the plaintext information or searched key-
word, it may act as an adversary and leak access patterns or other information
about outsourced encrypted data.
User The user in our environment can be physicians, pharmacists, or insurers. A
user wants to search a keyword in the outsourced data by the patient or data
owner.
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Figure 5.1: Use case diagram of the framework’s preparation subsystem
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5.2 The framework’s UML Diagrams
Various UML diagrams were applied in order to illustrate the structure of our system
along with all the constitutive classes as well as users and actors who perform actions
and roles in interaction with our system.
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 display the use case diagrams of our framework and
involved actors. As shown in Figure 5.1, Patient uses the Setup use case. This use
case prepares the encrypted data and all requirements for securely running queries
over the encrypted database. Setup includes GenerateKeys, PRFFunctions, Enc,
TSetSetup, and SendEDToServer use cases which are briefly discussed as follows:
1. GenerateKeys : This use case is responsible for generating unique keys for PRF
functions as well as paired keys for encryption and decryption methods.
2. PRFFunctions : The PRFFunctions use case provides PRFs. A pseudo random
function (PRF) efficiently maps the domain and range of the function. A PRF
is considered as a good one if it is not distinguishable from a real random
function.
3. Enc: Enc encrypts the indexes to be stored in tuples of TSet.
4. TSetSetup: The duty of this use case is the creation of TSet out of the set of
encrypted indexes.
5. SendEDToServer : SendEDToServer, included by the Setup use case, is respon-
sible for sending the encrypted data to the Server. In the preparation section of
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the framework, Server also deals with SendEDToServer use case and receives
the encrypted data from the data owner.
The other provided use case diagram, Figure 5.2, exhibits actors and use cases
participating in the search protocol. The User actor presents Physician, Insurer, or
Pharmacist actors. The main use case in Figure 5.2, Search, includes the following
use cases:
1. TokenGeneration: The Patient actor creates the token for the received query
using TokenGeneration and includes three use cases.
(a) FindLeastFrequentKeywordQuery : The data owner applies this use case
to select the least frequent keyword in the dataset among all keywords of
the query.
(b) TSetGetTag : This use case retrieves the least frequent keyword’s stag.
(c) AuthEnc: The duty of this use case is encrypting and signing stag and
blinding factors.
(d) PRFFunctions : The Patient applies PRFFunctions for generating the
least frequent keyword’s strap.
(e) UserSideSearch: User applies the UserSideSearch use case to receive the
token of his/her query as well as to send bxtokens to Server.
i. AskTokenFromPatientGivenQuery : In this use case, User receives
token for the query if he/she got authenticated.
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ii. Dec: This use case decrypts those received indexes from Server.
iii. PRFFunctions : The User actor applies this use case to generate en-
cryption keys.
2. ServerSideSearch: The Server actor authenticates User and both retrieves and
forwards encrypted indexes to User if the criteria are met.
(a) VerifyAuthDec: This use case decrypts the env and verifies stag which
consequently authenticates User.
(b) AskCthTokenArrayFormUser : This use case requests a specific bxtoken.
(c) TSetRetrieve: This use case retrieves the specific tuple from TSet.
User applies AskTokenFromPatientGivenQuery, gives query to Patient, and requests
the related encrypted token. User sends blinded tokens to Server and receives the en-
crypted indexes if those blinded traps match any indexes in XSet. ServerSideSearch,
UserSideSearch, and all other included use cases, shown in Figure 5.2, contribute to
the search protocol.
Figure 5.3, which is related to the class diagram of the proposed framework,
reveals implemented classes and their relationships. In the following section, I briefly
discuss properties and methods of each entity in Figure 5.3.
Query: This class only has a set of strings. Both Patient and User classes own an
object of this class and use that object to keep the boolean query which should
be queried on the cloud server.
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Figure 5.2: Use case diagram of the framework’s search protocol
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Token: Token includes the encrypted envelope which is prepared by Patient and
should be sent to Server by User. The User class has an object of the Token
class. Token also contains an array of bytes for strap which is token for least
frequent keyword of the query as well as a two-dimensional array of bytes for
bxtraps, which are trapdoors and their usages are discussed in detail in Section
5.3.
PlainEnv: This class has values for stag and all blinding factors(ρi). Both Patient
and Server classes have an object of PlainEnv class as their property.
Patient: The Patient class is the most important class in the framework. The
Patient class holds a set of xtags as the XSet. A tuple set, known as TSet,
is added to the Patient class. TSet preserves a list of encrypted inverted
indexes which are associated to each keyword. The TSet datastructure has
three specific algorithms (TSetSetup, TSetGetTag, and TSetRetrieve) for its
setup and access. Patient also has an object of Token to save the information of
env, straps and bxstraps which should be sent to User. bxtraps are the blinded
xtraps which are generated by the Patient for received Query. The Patient
class uses the GenerateKeys method to prepare a set of keys for encryption
methods and pseudo random functions. AuthEnc method, which takes the
encryption key (KM), stag, and random blinding factors, encrypts its inputs
and outputs env which determines whether the querier is authenticated.
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Figure 5.3: Class diagram of the framework
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User: The User class, which is designed for the querier in the framework, saves
its query in an object of the Query class. By receiving the env from Patient,
User saves it in token in addition to strap and generated bxtraps. The user
also saves encrypted indexes e, which are received from server, in eSet. The
Decryption method of the User class is invoked after all inverted indexes are
saved in eSet and Server, sends stop which means that the search process is
done.
Server: The Server class preserves TSet and XSet as searchable encrypted data.
The VerifyAuthDec method of Server decrypts env and obtains blinding fac-
tors. Obtaining valid factors proves that the user is authenticated. Server
applies TSetRetrieve to achieve the related tuple of the received stag from
TSet.
5.3 Process Flows
The major goal of this section is to demonstrate how processes and algorithms com-
bine to drive the privacy-preserving query processing system.
5.3.1 Prepare Encrypted Data
As illustrated in Algorithm 4, before outsourcing data to a cloud server, the data
owner, which is a patient in our system, needs to create the searchable encrypted
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Algorithm 4 Prepare Encrypted Data
1: procedure Setup(Data D, Array of Encryption Keys RDK[])
2: XSet← empty set for xtags
3: T← empty associative array for all allowed keywords (W )
4: KeySet← GenerateKeys() ⊲ KeySet contains KS, KX , KT , and KM
5: for each w ∈ W do
6: strap← F1(KS, w) ⊲ F1 is a pseudo random function
7: Ke ← F1(strap, 2) and Kz ← F1(strap, 1)
8: c← 1
9: for each indi of D’s documents which contains w do
10: rdki ← RDK(indi) ⊲ rdki is the encryption key for document i
11: xind← F2(KI , indi) ⊲ F2 is a pseudo random function
12: zc ← F2(Kz, c)
13: y ← xind · z−1c
14: e← Enc(Ke, indi)
15: t← t ∪ (e, y)
16: xtag ← gF2(KX ,w)·xind
17: XSet← XSet ∪ xtag
18: c← c+ 1
19: end for
20: T [w]← t
21: end for
22: (TSet,KT )← TSetSetup(T)
23: ED = (TSet,XSet,KM) ⊲ KM is a shared key between Patient and Server
24: SendEDToServer(ED)
25: end procedure
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data. In this regard, the patient should operate the SETUP procedure. In the first
step of the SETUP procedure, the required keys for encryption and PRFFunctions
are generated. Afterwards, for each keyword in the provided keyword list of data, all
encrypted indexes are stored in TSet and generated xtags are accumulated in XSet.
The accumulated xtags help the server to indicate that an encrypted keyword exists
in an encrypted document without revealing any information about the plain keyword
or document. Finally, the patient has to outsource TSet and XSet as the encrypted
data to the server. In order to delegate the search ability to clients, the patient and
server are required to share an encryption key (KM) for encrypting the stag and
blinding factors and authenticate the clients.
5.3.2 Query Execution
In this section, I discuss the query process in our framework. The query or search
in a multi-client framework consists of three procedures which should be operated
by all three parties of our framework. These three procedures are TokenGenerator,
UserSideSearch, and ServerSideSearch which are illustrated in Algorithms 5, 6, and
7.
At the initial step, the client sends his/her query to the patient. Algorithm 5
shows that after receiving the plain query, the patient generates the s-terms and
bxtraps for the query. As discussed in Sections 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9, s-terms include
stag and strap. stag is a secure inverted index of a keyword of the query which
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Algorithm 5 Generates authorized query (token) for User
1: procedure TokenGenerator(KeySet, Query w¯)
2: w1 ← FindLeastFrequentKeywordInQuery(w¯)
3: stag ← TSetGetTag(KT , w1)
4: strap← F1(KS, w1) ⊲ F1 is a pseudo random function
5: n← |w¯| ⊲ n is the number of keywords in Query
6: for each wi ∈ w¯ where i = 2, . . . , n do
7: ρi ← random blinding factor from Z
∗
p domain
8: bxtrapi ← g
Fp(KX ,wi)·ρi
9: end for
10: env ← AuthEnc(KM , (stag, ρ2, . . . , ρn)) ⊲ terms should be signed by Patient
11: token← {env, strap, bxtrap2, . . . , bxtrapn}
12: SendTokenToUser(token)
13: end procedure
is sent to the server and allows server to access the related encrypted records and
documents which contain this specific keyword. This keyword of the query has the
least frequency in the outsourced data in comparison to other keywords contained in
the query. Xtraps are trapdoors of the other keywords in the query which helps the
server to understand if a document has those keywords or not. However, in order to
keep the xtraps secure from the user, the patient applies blinding factors on xtraps
and produce bxtraps. Finally, the server encrypts the blinding factors and the stag
and encapsulates those as the env and sends that along produced bxtraps and strap
as the query token to the user who initially sends the plain query. Later, the user
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should send env to the server which proves that the user is authenticated by the
patient.
The next couple of procedures for the keyword search, which are depicted in
Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7, should be operated simultaneously by the querier
(User) and the server.
In the user side, which is explained in Algorithm 6, the querier(User) sends env
and stag to the server as soon as getting token from the data owner (Patient).
Afterwards, the querier starts to generate bxtoken continuously and sends them to
the server, until it receives the stop command from the server. Each bxtoken contains
a modified bxtrapzci for each keyword in the query which helps server to check if that
keyword of the query belongs to the document indc or not. The user receives an
encrypted document if all keywords belong to that document. The user later can
decrypt that document using Ke which is generated by a PRF using strap.
As displayed in Algorithm 7, in the server side of the keyword search, the server
checks if the querier is authenticated by decrypting the received env using the shared
key. As explained earlier, the server receives a shared encryption key from the data
owner (Patient) in Setup phase. Afterwards, the server accesses the tuple list and
encrypted records which contains the least frequent keyword by applying stag in
TSetRetrieve as the input. Subsequently, the server receives bxtokens from the user
and checks if all bxtrap[i]y/ρis in each bxtoken are members of XSet. If any bxtoken
satisfies mentioned condition, the server sends the related encrypted record to the
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Algorithm 6 User Side of the Search Protocol
1: procedure UserSideSearch
2: token← AskTokenFromPatientGivenQuery(w¯)
3: SendStagToServer(stag) and
4: SendEnvToServer(env) ⊲ env is encrypted and signed by Patient
5: Ke ← F1(strap, 2) and Kz ← F1(strap, 1)
6: eSet← empty set of encrypted documents
7: docSet← empty set of decrypted documents
8: while ReceiveStopFromServer() do
9: zc ← F1(Kz, c) ⊲ F1 is a pseudo random function
10: bxtoken[c]← empty array ⊲ bxtoken is a two-dimensional array
11: for i = 2, ..., n do
12: bxtoken[c][i]← bxtrapzci
13: end for
14: SendBXtokenToServer(bxtoken[c])
15: if e← ReceiveEFromServer() then
16: eSet← eSet ∪ e
17: end if
18: c← c+ 1
19: end while
20: for each ej in eSet do
21: indj ← Dec(Ke, ej)
22: docSet← docSet ∪ indj
23: end for
24: end procedure
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Algorithm 7 Server Side of the Search Protocol
1: procedure ServerSideSearch(Encrypted Date ED) ⊲ ED contains TSet
and XSet
2: env ← AskEnvFromUser()
3: (stag, ρ2, . . . , ρn)← VerifyAuthDec(KM , env)
4: if stag is NULL then
5: retrun
6: end if
7: for c = 1, . . . , sizeof(t) do
8: bxtoken[c]← AskCthTokenArrayFromUser()
9: (ec, yc)← c
th tuple of t
10: checkTerms← true
11: for i = 2, . . . , n do ⊲ n is the number of keywords in the query
12: if bxtoken[c][i]y/ρi is not member of XSet then
13: checkTerms← false
14: end if
15: end for
16: if checkTerms is true then
17: SendEToUser(ec)
18: end if
19: end for
20: SendStopToPatient()
21: end procedure
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user. In other words, this part of the algorithm checks if encrypted documents, which
contain the least frequent keyword, contain the rest of keywords in the query. The
algorithm then sends those documents which meet the requirements to the querier.
In the following chapter, the implementation and experimental results of the
proposed system.
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Chapter 6
Implementation and Experimental
Results
This chapter discusses the implementation of the framework for Privacy-Preserving
Query Processing on Health Data. In other words, the implemented framework pro-
vides searchable symmetric encryption for multiple users in the health area. This
framework is implemented in Java language using the IntelliJ IDEA framework. The
implemented framework uses Maven, a build automation tool, to build the project
and its libraries. This project engages various libraries in order to enhance the
performance and to provide more features. The most important applied libraries
are the Clusion library and the Bouncy Castle library. Clusion is a handy library
which provides searchable symmetric encryption algorithms, as well as other func-
tionalities, such as Indexing, which are essential for this project. The Bouncy Castle
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library prepares the cryptographic primitives. In the following sections, I give a brief
introduction to the applied programming language, programming framework, and
libraries.
6.1 Programming Language
6.1.1 Java
Java is known as one of the most popular languages in desktop, mobile, and client-
server web development. In 2013, Beneke and Wieldt announced that 9 million
developers use Java as their programming language around the world. Java is a
concurrent, object-oriented, class-based programming language. The creators of Java
intended that this programming language have few implementation dependencies.
The Java slogan, “write once, run anywhere”, reflects the fewer dependencies concept.
This phrase means that a Java application, which is compiled on a platform, can
run on all other platforms and operating systems without recompilation. The Java
compiler converts the Java applications’ source codes to bytecodes (Java binary code)
which can run on every platform that operates Java virtual machine (JVM). JVM is
a virtual computing machine that interprets Java bytecodes. In other words, JVM
is an interpreter between Java binary codes and operating systems. This feature
in Java language supports the project to easily run on all of the various current
platforms.
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6.2 Integrated Development Environment (IDE)
6.2.1 IntelliJ IDEA
IntelliJ IDEA is a favourite integrated development environment (IDE) for devel-
oping programs in Java language. The JetBrains company developed this IDE in
the community and proprietary editions, but both can be used for commercial de-
velopment. In the Infoworld report, IntelliJ achieved the first rank in overall score
between the most favourite Java programming IDEs: Eclipse, NetBeans, JDevel-
oper, and JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA. In this benchmark, the documentation, ease of
use, plug-in ecosystem, and Java features were assessed [13]. In 2014, Google devel-
oped its first Android IDE, Android Studio 1.0, based on the free edition of IntelliJ
IDEA. The latest version of IntelliJ IDEA supports Java 9, provides UI designer for
Android, and Play 2.0 for Scala [66].
6.3 Apache Maven
Apache Maven is mainly used as an automation build tool for Java language which
describes how the target program or application has to be built as well as the depen-
dencies. An XML file for each project determines the steps of building the applica-
tion, dependencies, modules, structures, folders and required libraries, and plug-ins.
Maven handles dependencies of the project and automatically downloads, stores, and
uses them to build the target application [1].
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6.4 Bouncy Castle Library
The Bouncy Castle library is a well-known cryptography library which provides many
cryptographic algorithms and APIs in Java and C# languages. Bouncy Castle in-
cludes low-level and high-level components which are the light-weight API and the
Java cryptography extension (JCE) provider. The first level component, or light-
weight API, provides all base cryptographic algorithms. Some developers use the
low-level component of Bouncy Castle for applications and devices with limited
memory. The JCE provider is using the other component and provides easy-to-use
cryptographic methods with a lot of predefined configurations. Many Java projects
and applications, which require cryptographic operations, use JCE provider [2].
6.5 The Clusion Library
The Clusion library, which is implemented in Java language, provides multiple search-
able symmetric encryption (SSE) schemes as modules. This library supports recent
studies and popular operations like disjunctive, conjunctive, and boolean keyword
search. All implemented schemes in Clusion generally have a sub-linear time com-
plexity for their search phase. The Clusion library uses Bouncy Castle Library in
the back-end which is introduced in Section 6.4. The Clusion library, which is pro-
vided under the GNU General Public License v3 (GPLv3), is easily accessible on the
Internet [43, 51].
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6.5.1 Manipulate Various Record Types
Clusion supports various types of files as the data which can be outsourced. PDF
files, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Power Point, HTML, and txt files are all included.
Clusion applies Apache Lucene in order to obtain the keyword list for all data. In
order to manipulate PDF and Microsoft documents, Clusion uses Apache PDFBox
and Apache POI libraries.
6.6 Experimental Setup
I conducted some experiments on a high-end desktop with an Intel Core i7-4790 CPU
@ 3.60 GHz (8 CPUs) as processor and a 16GB RAM as memory, running Microsoft
Windows 10 64-bit (Build 15063).
My analysis demonstrates the performance of the implemented method and frame-
work regarding computation and execution time, as well as storage and communi-
cation overheads. The computation and execution time calculated for the search-
able encryption scheme includes the construction of the inverted index, building the
searchable encrypted data, determining unique keywords, and their frequencies for
all documents, generating the associated dictionary, and running the actual search.
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6.6.1 Dataset
I selected the dataset of “EHR Products Used for Meaningful Use Attestation” which
was publicly available on the Health IT dashboard website [4]. This dataset was ac-
quired over the Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive Program (MEIP). This
program motivates EHR providers to upgrade and show that they are adopting cer-
tified EHR technology. The MEIP dataset [34] in the accessed time had 1932500
records. This data was acquired in seven years of the EHR Incentive Program. I
applied an application to create a separate file for each record to test the perfor-
mance of the developed framework for various sizes of data. Table 6.1 provides the
description for all data fields in the dataset.
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Table 6.1: Dataset documentation
Data Field Data Description
NPI National Provider Identifier
Provider Type Type of Health Care Provider
Business State Territory U.S. State or Territorial Location of
Provider
ZIP ZIP Code Where Hospital or Health
Care Professional Practice Is Located.
Specialty Clinical Specialty of Health Care
Provider
Hospital Type Type of Hospital.
Program Type CMS Incentive Program in Which
Provider Is Registered
Vendor Name Electronic Health Record (EHR) Ven-
dor Name
EHR Product Name Electronic Health Record (EHR) Prod-
uct Name
Product Classification Electronic Health Record (EHR) Prod-
uct Classification
Attestation ID Unique Identification Number for Each
Meaningful Use Attestation
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6.7 Results
The experiments of this thesis assessed the performance of the implemented frame-
work for privacy preserving query processing. These experiments assessed the per-
formance of the framework in various ways. In these experiments, the corresponding
effects of the following paradigms on the performance and execution time were in-
vestigated: a database’s scale; the conjunctive multi-term query; constant result set.
In order to assess the scalability of the framework of the query engine, I generated
several subsets of my dataset in various sizes. The original dataset of experiments
had about two million records of EHR.
The first experiment investigated the execution time of single-term searches for
constant result sets and proportional result sets. I also demonstrated the execution
time for proportional result sets by MySQL. Figure 6.1 shows that the execution time
of a privacy preserving query in the framework has a linear relation with the database
size and the execution time is independent if the size of result set is constant. Figure
6.1 also shows that the framework provides results faster than MySQL only for single-
term queries with small result sets. In Figure 6.1, the vertical and horizontal axis
are respectively related to the time and size of database and both are shown in the
logarithmic scale.
In the second experiment, single-term queries versus two-term queries were as-
sessed. Figure 6.2 shows the results of single-term and two-term queries with various
selectivities. The selectivity of a keyword wi (|DB[wi]|) is the number of all doc-
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uments which contain that keyword (wi) in the dataset. Figure 6.2 demonstrates
execution times for querying “Dermatology” in various databases where the selec-
tivity of that keyword can be 100, 1,000, 10,000, 100,000, and 1,000,000. Figure 6.2
also shows execution times for querying the conjunctive keywords “Dermatology”
and “Illinois” for the mentioned various databases and selectivities. In all queries,
the “Dermatology” term acted as the s-term. For two-term queries, all tuples for
the s-term retrieved from the TSet are checked against the XSet. While two-term
queries had to do more duties and check retrieved tuples against XSet, their execu-
tion times were not too much longer than single-term queries. In other words, the
execution time was totally affected by disk input/output and network latencies.
The last experiment of this thesis investigated the effect of the result set’s size
or constant selectivity on the execution time while querying databases with different
sizes. This experiment showed that two-term queries on various databases, which re-
ceived the same result sets, have almost the same running times. Figure 6.3 illustrates
that “Nephrology” and “Dermatology” keywords, which had constant selectivities
of 100 and 10000 in all databases, spent 0.01 second and 2.5 seconds for their query
executions in all databases respectively. In other words, the execution time is mostly
impressed by tuple retrievals and I/O latencies, which were observed in the previous
experiment as well.
In summary, the experiments showed that the implemented framework is very
effective having about two million records of EHR. The framework ran significantly
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quicker for those queries with small retrieved records. For two-term queries, the
performance of the framework depends on the selecting of the appropriate s-term.
In other words, poor selectivity ruins the framework’s efficiency. These experiments
also showed that the framework can compete with MySQL while s-term is properly
selected.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Works
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, I targeted the data privacy violation which happens for data owners
(e.g. patients) in the health domain. In health systems, whole data is usually
shared between trusted parties. I introduced an applicable framework for the privacy-
preserving query processing and keyword search on health data which addresses
the aforementioned issue. The main purpose of this framework is protecting the
health information of users while dealing with cloud or online health systems and
outsourcing their private health data. This system lets the data owner encrypt
his/her private data, outsource that data and authorize some data users to run
queries and extract their required data while the query is operated by a cloud server.
The system maintains privacy of the query and results against the cloud server. To
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clarify, this framework provides secure multi-client query processing and keyword
search on health data. In this research I have applied the notable SSE scheme,
Multi-Client Oblivious Cross-Tags (MC-OXT), which is proposed by Cash et al.
[26]. According to the MC-OXT scheme’s security, the limited amount of leakage
of the system while running queries is determined and it is proved that the system
is IND-CKA2 secure [19, 26, 42]. IND-CKA2 is defined in Section 3.3.3.3. The
complexity analysis and experimental results prove that the proposed framework is
applicable in a practical environment.
7.2 Future Works
The implemented framework can be extended in various domains. The implementing
of dynamic query processing, which influences data owners to add, update, or remove
data while the authorized users are able to run query could be a next step. A recent
study conducted by Kamara and Moataz [43], provided a new method for arbitrary
disjunctive and boolean queries in a sub-linear time which is efficient and can be
applied for multi-client framework query processing on health data.
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